













There is now good evidence that some religious ideas and perspectives have an influence on their adherents’ ability to cope with life stresses. However, there have been few attempts to explain this effect by recourse to experimentally-tested models of human cognition. In the present paper, the author argues that this shortfall both limits the usefulness of statistically-based studies and impedes the acceptance of religious or spiritual care as part of healthcare practice.
A model based on that developed by cognitive psychologists of religion is subjected to initial, inductive testing in terms of its ability to explain some of the essential features and counter-intuitive results from the research literature on religious coping. The author concludes that, in the particular context represented by an individual in hospital, the model has significant explanatory potential and clarifies some recurring themes in the literature on coping.
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Introduction
	A trickle of official reports and policy documents (Department of Health [DoH] 2003, 2009; NHS Education for Scotland [NeS] 2008, 2009; Welsh Assembly 2010 ) witness to the fact that the concepts of “spirituality” and “spiritual care” now have an accepted if restricted place in the overall self-understanding of the NHS.  This acceptance sets the notion apart from “religion”, which has enjoyed no such renaissance in the thinking of policymakers. 

Thus, for example, the Royal College of Psychiatrists’ recent leaflet makes the following distinction:
Religious traditions certainly include individual spirituality, which is universal. But each religion has its own distinct community-based worship, beliefs, sacred texts and traditions.

Spirituality is not tied to any particular religious belief or tradition. Although culture and beliefs can play a part in spirituality, every person has their own unique experience of spirituality - it can be a personal experience for anyone, with or without a religious belief. It's there for anyone. Spirituality also highlights how connected we are to the world and other people. (RCoP 2010)
	There may be good political and practical reasons for this separation of a supposedly value-neutral and universal spirituality from the more socially selective and complex world of religious belief and practice, but the distinction impoverishes both concepts. On the one hand, spirituality remains a “highly subjective concept” (Mayers & Johnston 2008), a kind of “metaphysical marshmallow that is non-specific, unlocated, thin, uncritical, dull and un-nutritious” (Pattison 2001).  This vagueness has confined spirituality to the category of “holistic” or “patient centred” care, and Paley (2008) clearly touched a nerve when he referred to it as a “metaphysical backwater”, beneath the contempt of reductionist clinicians and devoid of any content not smuggled in from religion (Kevern 2010).

By contrast, talk about the  practices and beliefs of actual religious communities has largely dried up, although some recent voices (e.g. Dein 2004) have pointed to the way this failure to engage is compromising clinical practice, at least in Psychiatry. Increasingly, responsibility for “religious needs” has been handed over to those overseeing the Managing Diversity agenda, as in the recent NHS briefing document (DoH 2009): thus, religious concerns are in danger of being viewed as having salience only insofar as they may create difficulties for clinical care managers, for example because of dietary restrictions. 
	In practice, this means that the place for talk both of “spirituality” and of religion in the NHS is precarious.  In the absence of testable outcomes the place for spirituality in health care will always be at the whim of Trust managers.  Conversely, unless “religion” can claim that its content and practices have secular relevance they cannot form part of public policy.	One promising development in this respect is the extensive and growing body of literature on “religious coping”, which attempts to correlate the prevalence of particular religious practices and belief-statements with individuals’ ability to withstand or profit from stressful life situations.  The firm statistical basis of at least some studies gives the results some robustness, and a number of suggestive patterns have emerged  (e.g. Pargament 1998). However, there is little in the way of theory to explain these patterns or to predict how they will be replicated across variations in, for example, culture, age or gender. What is missing here is a model that gives an account of why spirituality/religion is important, what its main features are and how it may function in a healthcare context. Specifically:
1.	If  concrete practices and attitudes can be identified that are therapeutically significant and clinically testable, can they be separated from their original religious matrix and used in a secular healthcare context?
2.	If so, is there any basis for the belief that they will function in comparable ways in a range of contexts, so that where such a practice or attitude is identifiable it is possible to be fairly confident of its likely effect on a patient’s progress and recovery? 
3.	What factors influence the adoption of one belief or practice over another in an individual case, and can/should a plan for health management include strategies to substitute beneficial religious views for unhelpful ones?
	In this paper, I will propose that a model drawn from emerging results in the cognitive psychology of religion has some potential to address the conceptual gap.  This hypothesis will be tested by applying the model to a selection of studies from the literature on religious coping with a view to ascertaining whether it is capable of providing at least partial answers to the questions above. In order to contain the range of possible variables in this analysis, I will restrict its scope to material generated by one particular methodology within the framework of a particular understanding of “religious coping,” that of Kenneth Pargament, his colleagues and followers. This provides by far the most extensive quantitative work on the effect of religion or spirituality on an individual's response to treatment.

Background: Pargament's “religious coping” as a body of evidence looking for a theory.

	Pargament’s basic hypothesis is that a person's religious or spiritual beliefs and practices – from their image of a divine being through to the frequency with which they consult a minister of religion – is likely to affect the way they cope with life stressors and so have a measurable effect on their mental, if not physical, health and wellbeing.  The task is then to identify the key “religious coping” mechanisms and isolate their influence from the many potential variables. The ultimate goal is to identify 'red flag' religious behaviour and, perhaps, to intervene to modify it in a constructive direction (Pargament 1997) 
	Pargament's method is an intensively statistical one, as exemplified by the collaborative paper (Pargament, Koenig & Perez 2000) developing his RCOPE scale as a measure of religious coping. The team start with a rough-and-ready  definition of religion as fulfilling 5 functions (meaning; control; comfort/closeness to God; intimacy with others; transformation) and derives from it a long, very speculative list of possible ways in which religious practice and beliefs may affect mental wellbeing and ability to deal with stress. They then test this on a relatively small sample to find those items in the long list that are strongly correlated to health/wellbeing, deleting or combining those which seem to exert no independent influence. This revised test is then used on a larger sample to generate an extensive, and statistically robust, account of the ways in which religion/spirituality supports or undermines coping in stressful situations. 

	As this method has been developed, it has given rise to a  number of different typologies, and Pargament himself has come up with several (e.g. Pargament 1990; Pargament, Ensing, Falgout, Olsen, Reilly, Haitsma, & Warren 1990;  Pargament, Kennell, Hathaway, Grevengoed, Newman & Jones, 1988; Pargament, Olsen, Reilly, Falgout, Ensing, & Vanhaitsma, 1992; Pargament, Smith, Koenig & Perez, 1998). However, (for reasons which will become clearer as the paper progresses) our interest is in that aspect of religious coping which is to do with how cognitive beliefs influence response to stressful situations such as illness. Here, over the course of his research Pargament identifies four basic options:

1.	Collaborative. The person holds that god​[1]​ is actively assisting them in finding a creative response to their condition.
2.	Deferring. The person trusts in god to look after them whatever the outcome and so maintains hope.
3.	Self-directing. The person believes that there is a god, but not one who is willing or able to intervene in their particular case. They are therefore responsible for their own wellbeing (Pargament 1988). This ‘style’ has proved difficult to define precisely, but the approach here will be that of Phillips et al (2004) which subdivides it into two sub-themes to be discussed in detail later.
4.	Plead. The person believes that god will intervene miraculously, regardless of the opinion of others or anything the person might or might not do. (Pargament et al 1990)

	The robustness and flexibility of this approach has led to it being widely adopted: Rosmarin, Pargament, Krumrei &Flannelly (2009) state that at the time of writing their paper there were more than 250 studies using this and related typologies of religious coping. Furthermore, it seems to give some consistent results: in particular, around the benefits of the Collaborative coping style and the negative outcomes associated with the Plead style (Yangarber-Hicks 2004). 

	Where there has been criticism, it has tended to be to do with the execution of research rather than the basic methodology, and is in principle correctable. Thus, much of Pargament’s work has been on undergraduates from a single university: although sample sizes were large, the types of stressors, overwhelmingly Christian beliefs represented and cultural and demographic ranges were necessary limited (Koenig McCullough & Larson, 2001). Widening its scope, attempts have since been made to adapt the method for American Hindus (Tarakeshwar, Pargament & Mahoney 2003) Muslims (Abu Raiya, Pargament, Mahoney & Stein 2008) and Jews ( Rosmarin, Pargament and Mahoney, 2009). In addition, studies have been made of religious coping in a multicultural Amsterdam population (Braam,Schrier, Tuinebreijer, Beekman, Dekker, de Wit 2010), and religious and secular groups in the UK (Loewenthal Cinnirella, Evdoka, & Murphy 2001; Lewis, Maltby & Day 2005) Without going into the details of these studies (some of which are compromised by small sample size) it is clear that the method can in principle be used outside its original target population.

	However, his method is less able to address the issues identified in the introduction to this paper. Pargament et al (2000) asks, “What is it about religious coping that affects the outcome of major life stressors” (p.520) but cannot go on to ask “Why do these particular features thus affect the outcome?” without a more systematic theoretical base.  As already noted, his underlying model of religious belief is a rough-and-ready synthesis of five influential ones culled form the literature without any appeal to underlying principles, and his definition of religion as “a search for significance in ways related to the sacred” (1997, p. 32) simply replaces on undefined term (religion) with two others (significance, coping). 

Pargament could justly point out that his working definition is sufficient for his own purposes, since he is seeking correlations between particular beliefs, practices and social activities and mental health outcomes: it is hardly relevant to ask how they qualify as ‘religious’. However, in the absence of a testable theory of how these correlations come about, his conclusions are necessarily limited.  He can thus present examples of poor religious coping as “red flag” symptoms to warn medical workers of possible difficulties, but will never be able to demonstrate a causal or predictive connection with his statistically-descriptive technique. In terms of the questions raised in the introduction:

1.	If  concrete practices and attitudes can be identified that are therapeutically significant and clinically testable, can they be separated from their original religious matrix and used in a secular healthcare context?
Pargament's method means that he can identify a correlative and (where sufficient data exist) even causative relation between religious coping strategies and wellbeing.  What he cannot do is identify a structural relationship. In other words, he cannot identify the universal human capacities and functions which, in themselves, are reflected in the diverse strategies that he describes. This means that, faced with somebody who  claims no identifiable religious beliefs and yet manages to cope very well, there is no basis for speculating on what may be fulfilling the same function or therefore any guidance on where to look for it. For Pargament's approach to gain acceptance in the more secular environment of the UK, it must be demonstrably true for those who understand themselves and their world in non-religious ways. The appeal must therefore be to acknowledged universals of human existence. 
2.	If so, is there any basis for the belief that they will function in comparable ways in a range of contexts  . . .? Without a general theory of why particular strategies work, this tool cannot be transferred from one context to another without, in effect, starting from the beginning. Thus, conclusions which are valid for Christian undergraduates in the midwest USA  might be valid for Muslim hospital patients in the UK, but there is no way of evaluating the likelihood that this is the case or the potential variables to be taken into account. Consequently, in order to produce clinically valid evidence for this latter group the only recourse is to repeat the whole of Pargament's method from the beginning: a drawn-out and resource-intensive process. For the same reason, there is little basis for the confident identification of “red flag” symptoms in patients who are culturally distant from the American protestants comprising Pargament’s core sample.
3.	What factors influence the adoption of one belief or practice over another in an individual case, and can/should a plan for health management include strategies to substitute beneficial religious views for unhelpful ones? Consequently, the predictive power of Pargament’s approach is limited in a secular or culturally and religiously plural context, and this perhaps explains its limited appeal for clinical practice. 
	Some corrective to these limitations is offered by Flannelly and his colleagues (Flannelly, Ellison, Galek, Koenig, 2007, 2008, 2010), who attempt a causal and predictive model of how religious beliefs function to moderate anxiety in one particular group of patients.. They argue  (Flannelly et al 2010, p.247) that the cognitive pressure applied by certain religious beliefs can both harm and help the patient: “if psychiatric symptoms can be caused by beliefs that the world is dangerous, they should be ameliorated by beliefs that provide a sense of security, such as belief in a Close and Loving God” . Drawing on Evolutionary Threat Assessment Systems Theory and proposing that it is influenced by particular beliefs, they set out a model of how religious beliefs may raise or lower anxiety. This may be seen as complementary to the present work, but remains in the realm of a single effect of religious belief (on anxiety) and an essentially “theological” approach to religious ideas as expressing explicit beliefs. The issue is therefore not with its validity, but with its narrow scope. Is it possible to identify a broader canvas, a “metatheory” of sorts, on which to project and interpret Pargament’s results?  In what follows, I will propose a model drawn from the cognitive psychology of religion as a candidate for this role. 

The cognitive psychology of religion and its key concepts
	Over the last two decades there has been a rapid growth in experimental research on the cognitive basis of religious belief, and a significant convergence between the perspectives of  experimental psychology (e.g. Barrett 2004, Slone 2004), evolutionary psychology (e.g. Sloan Wilson 2002, Tremlin 2006) and anthropologists of religion (e.g. Atran 2002,  Boyer 2001). The result is a working model whose structure attracts widespread interdisciplinary support, even if its details remain to be filled out experimentally. The starting-point is the hypothesis that the human mind is constructed in such a way that human beings are disposed to belief in gods (Slone 2004, Bloom 2009, Murray & Goldberg 2009); and that the character of these beliefs gives important clues to the way human cognition works in general. Conversely, insight into the process of human cognition gives important insights into the salience and power of particular sorts of religious belief. At first sight, then, it seems plausible that this line of enquiry may provide the theoretical counterpart to Pargament's empirical findings.
	For the purposes of this paper, the version of the model I will be using is a synthesis of the findings of many of the above which has come to be referred to as the ‘standard model’ (Bloom 2009). I will be referring most to Barrett (2004), who has been responsible for much of the groundbreaking research in the cognitive science of religion and himself professes some religious belief;  but his work does not in itself amount to evidence either for or against the validity of the beliefs discovered and indeed has been used in atheist polemic (see e.g. Bering 2011).  
1.	Prereflective reasoning. 
		Cognitive psychologists such as Barrett (2004) distinguish our unreflective, day-to-day “quick and dirty” reasoning from the careful, balanced, logical, resource-intensive reasoning that is exemplified in religious dogma or scientific thought. For example, although it is possible to maintain the meaninglessness of a series of events, in many respects this is counter-intuitive: even hardline materialists such as Richard Dawkins occasionally catch themselves ascribing intentionality to “Nature” or “Evolution” . This distinction between our day-to-day reasoning and the settled formulae of religious belief give rise to the “theological incorrectness” of Slone (2004): our intuitive beliefs are more likely to reflect the way our minds work than logically-held creedal statements. Equally, in a healthcare context there is evidence that, when under pressure, people use readily available religious heuristics (Carone & Barone 2001) rather than logically-coherent, reasoned-out beliefs that are difficult to maintain. This means that the religious ideas most likely to be deeply held and positively adaptive will be distinguished not by their creedal purity but by the way they reflect the deep architecture ofthe human mind. 

2.	Hypersensitivity to Agency , sometimes reified in the positing of a “Hypersensitive Agency Detection Device” (HADD) (Barrett 2004, pp.31-45) is fairly easy to demonstrate: faced with, for example, an unexpected noise, it predisposes us to ask “Who’s there?” rather than, “What’s that?”. It is hypersensitive in the sense that it assumes the presence of an active agent more readily than is warranted by the frequency of such agents, but this can be assumed to have conferred an historic evolutionary advantage: repeatedly imagining beings that aren’t there carries with it little evolutionary cost; however, failing to respond to a rustle which turns out to be a predator would have a great evolutionary cost!
	A practical implication of this finding is that human beings may generally find it easier to believe in divine agents than not, and that a balanced mental state is more likely to include some transaction with divine beings than not. This creates for reductionists a set of problems redolent of those surrounding the theory of ‘positive illusions’ (Taylor & Brown, 1988) – that positive mental adjustment is not equivalent to adaptation to empirical data about the world and nothing else. There are good clinical reasons to take talk of gods seriously, whether or not healthcare professionals and their employers consider such talk to be mistaken (see Kevern 2010). 

3.	Theory of Mind. The data on this emerge primarily from studies on developmental psychology and appear to demonstrate that we are “hard-wired” to find purpose in events and objects. This may be closely linked to our capacity for language and sociality: we have a theory of mind (ToM) that allows us to imagine what another person is thinking and feeling on the basis of their actions. It is also linked to our early experience of change as generally taking place through conscious agency (e.g. Barrett & Richert 2003, Gergely & Csibra 2003, Keleman 1999)
	A practical implication of this finding is that human beings will inevitably look for patterns and purpose in objects (such as the disease afflicting them) or events (such as its progress) and that their sense of security and control over the situation is linked to their ability to find such patterning.  Inevitably, the motivations and strategies of imagined agents will be modelled upon their own: human characteristics such as compassion, constancy, anger and abandonment will be overlaid on a series of events.
	Consequently, one function of what Barrett terms the ”Theory of Mind Tool” is to sift and reinforce the immediate intuitions thrown up by the HADD:
. . . if ToM can suggest an agent’s desires and aims relevant to the event, it affirms to HADD that the event was goal directed, increasing HADD’s confidence that agency has been discovered. Thus HADD’s work is not in isolation, and ToM’s flexibility and readiness to explain subtle signs of agency encourage HADD’s touchiness. (Barrett 2004, p.42)


	Although this model of the origins of human beliefs in god has pretensions to comprehensiveness, some of its limitations are plain. It treats religion as essentially internally-generated from the architecture of the mind, and glosses over the actual practice of religion as a communal and social fact. In the terms used in the introduction to this paper, it seems to refer more precisely to ‘spirituality’, in the sense of individually-maintained beliefs that may or may not be related to a wider religious or social matrix, selected on personal criteria. It is therefore likely to be a poor predictor of the structure and functioning of religions as social and historical phenomena; but may have particular relevance for predicting the behaviour of individuals when separated from their accustomed forms of support and driven back on their own resources. Since this is a reasonably good description of hospital patients, it is worth asking the question whether this model may have the capacity to model the role functions and key features of spirituality in this context. 
	The hypothesis that I will be testing here is that this model provides an adequate and explanatorily-useful theoretical basis for the key findings of Pargament and his associates in relation to the cognitive aspects of religious coping, when these are separated out from other variables (such as frequency of church attendance) in the way that they are for hospital inpatients. The way to test this hypothesis will be by bringing it to bear on the data and seeing whether it sheds any light, by means of  a review of key research papers that focus on these cognitive ‘coping styles’. The review will be taken to have provided sufficient reason to engage in further analysis of the model's utility if:
1.	It is possible to use the model to provide a suggestive theoretical account of the reasons for the main strategies of religious coping identified by Pargament
2.	in a given paper, the model provides a way of understanding results which seem counterintuitive or at odds with the author's own expectations




	A sample of recent studies using the categories of religious coping developed by Pargament et al was surveyed with a view to identifying the regularities and anomalies outlined above. Clearly, it is not possible to be comprehensive in a paper of this length; I have therefore concentrated on review papers and on those that represent an extension of research into a new area (such as a different religious group). Furthermore, it turns out that the number of studies that uses this distinct taxonomy of coping styles  while at the same time taking account of other variables in the coping repertoire (for example, frequency of attendance at religious events)turns out to be fairly small. Consequently, I was left with 19 papers which offered significant contributions to the testingof this hypothesis. The results are therefore to be read as inductive, rather than deductive, in character.

1. On belief as a cognitive asset

	The starting point is provided by an important review by Larson & Larson (2003) which reports on a couple of studies that appear to demonstrate the importance of cognitive approaches to religious coping in circumstances where the patient concerned is separated from their accustomed sources of religious identity and self-expression. Study showed that including spiritual content in therapy significantly accelerated recovery from depression. This was true when the therapist wasn't religious (Propst, Ostrom, Watkins, Dean, & Mashburn 1992) and also when the patients were Muslim (Azhar, Varma & Dharap 1994). The significance of these findings (as opposed to many others that conclude that it is psychologically helpful for patients to talk about their beliefs) is that the effect is found even when the patient is talking to somebody potentially ignorant or disapproving of their religious position: it is the expression that is significant, rather than the interaction. The patient is developing their own form of religious coping in a cognitive medium.

	This raises the question of what, cognitively speaking, needs to be part of a 'coping strategy' In a study by Pargament, Koenig, Tarakeshwar, & Hahn (2001), which Larson & Larson (2003) also quote, a two-year longitudinal study of mortality among a group of elderly people found that  mortality was more likely among those who believed God had abandoned them (to themselves, or to the Devil) and/or had ceased to love them; however, the belief that God was punishing them for their lack of devotion did not raise mortality. This result seems to cut across Pargament's own assumption of a functional basis for religion, which would predict the same sort of spiritual distress in all those who believed God was refusing to help them, regardless of whether this was for hostile (abandoning) motives or critically-loyal (punishing) ones. 

	A similar counterintuitive challenge to Pargament's functionalism comes from a study by Flannelly et al (2008). Testing Pargament’s theory of religious coping in relation specifically to beliefs about life after death, they found that even having a negative belief (for example, that the afterlife was a place of punishment) was better than having no belief at all. This makes poor sense if religion is constructed solely around the concept of ‘comfort’, but is more comprehensible if the belief in a (negative) life after death is still a validation of deep intuitions about the persistence of the ‘soul’ and so of  the meaning of the present.

	Thus the evidence points to the finding that, in a crisis, belief in anything is better than belief in nothing. This is consonant with the model of religious beliefs as having their origin in the HADD: in the face of a crisis, human beings cast around for a cause or key agent. Their anxiety is likely to be alleviated by the simple fact of having identified an agent (however unpleasant) prior to and independently of any questions about whether the agent is well-disposed towards them or not. In the second case cited above, anxiety abut the prospect of death is likely to be alleviated by the sense that one knows one is about to enter the present of an agent, even if the agent may not be well-disposed. 
	




2. On religious coping styles

	The actual form and strategies of religious coping are, of course, a matter of particular concern here, and a key paper (Yangarber-Hicks 2004) tests the cognitive coping styles in considerable detail. She found broad and consistent evidence that, among the styles identified by Pargament, the Collaborative and Deferring ones had generally positive effects, whereas the Self-directing and Plead strategies were correlated with less positive outcomes. Subjecting them to a more fine-grained analysis, she concluded that only collaborative styles of coping gave a consistently positive outcome, and in most studies Plead was found to be generally maladaptive (see also Pargament et al 2000). Similarly, in a study of suicidal thoughts and behaviours in African American adolescents, Molock et al (2006) found a positive correlation to self-directing and a negative correlation to collaborative coping styles. 

The adaptive value of Collaborative and Deferring Styles might be expected from Larson & Larson above. However, research suggests(Hathaway & Pargament 1990) that the ways in which the first two strategies affect recovery are distinct from each other. The Collaborative style (like the Self-Directing Style) did not necessarily give rise to a greater sense of wellbeing in the short term, but was linked to an increased sense of empowerment and engagement in recovery-enhancing activities. By contrast, the Deferring style did not seem to empower in the same way, but gave more comfort, acceptance and so an improved quality of life despite the persistence of the condition. It thus seems likely that the most appropriate coping style depends upon the capacity of the patient to influence their own recovery: where they can, a Collaborative or SD style is appropriate, but if faced with an intractable situation then the Deferring style is much more positively adaptive, although it is correlated with a less active pursuit of recovery (see also Bickel et al 1998).   	






The findings so far suggest that

(a) as implied by the primacy of the HADD, it is more important to locate god than for god to be capable of changing the situation for the better. This is shown by two apparent findings: that a punishing god is better than no god at all; and that it is more useful to believe in a benign and powerless god than an abandoning and powerful one, as demonstrated by the detailed work on the Self-Directing style. 

(b) However, positively adaptive religious coping is best expressed in a belief in a benign god with whom the subject has a reciprocal relationship: neither independently self-directing nor passive pleading styles show the same benefits.  The key supplement provided by the ToM may be to do with the notion of an active relationship. Pargament himself (1988) identified a level of ‘intimacy’ or relatedness as critical to religious coping, and this can be understood as linked to the human capacity to construct a character for god in the imagination which is then used as an interpretative tool.  From this perspective, the Plead and Self-Directing styles seem like imperfectly-realised versions of the Deferring and Collaborative styles respectively: god responds to the subject (Plead) or the subject responds to god (Self-Directing),  but not in a way characterised by mutuality.

The survey so far has indicated the primacy of imagined relationship followed by  projected intention. However, it may well be argued that this construction reflects a particular american, pietistic religious tradition: one in which a relationship with god modelled along the lines of a human relationship is part of public rhetoric and consciousness. In order to address these issues, we will now turn to a selection of studies undertaken with other religious groups and/or nationalities.


3. Hard wiring or soft evidence?
 

	If the model derived from cognitive psychology is valid at all, it is valid in all cultures and contexts. If religious coping is a reflection of the architecture of the human mind, rather than simply the structure of particular religious (american protestant)creeds, the same principles should be applicable to those of other religions and, in principle, those with no overt religious beliefs at all. This is of crucial practical importance in a context such as the NHS, where assumptions of religious allegiance cannot ethically be made. Non-theistic and secular forms of spirituality will need to be recognised alongside theistic ones. ​[2]​ 

A large-scale study of coping in a non-christian but theistic context is that conducted by Rosmarin et al (2009). In their JCOPE scale they find a comparable correlation in Judaism between mental health and positive religious coping, centred on attempts to strengthen the relationship with god. This seems to be prior to and more powerful than the attempt to strengthen bonds of religious and communal identity, as demonstrated in their confirmatory factor analysis (p.677). But the same reservations apply here. Judaism is a theistic religion and many of the details of Christian religious coping activity have direct parallels in Jewish practice. This effect is likely to been hanced by the fact that these are americanized Jews, and some features – for example, the stress on a personal relationship with god – may not be recognized in most forms of Judaism found in the UK. 

As an example of a non-theistic but religious pattern of religious coping, we may turn to  the followingstudy of a (small, americanized) sample of Hindus (Tarakeshwar Pargament & Mahoney, 2003) . This gives some initial encouragement to the hypothesis we are testing,, since it found both a structural similarity and differences in orientation that appeared to derive from the details of religious world-views. Thus the authors found that two essential foci could be correlated with positive religious coping: a focus on god and a focus on personal spiritual development. They plausibly theorized that this duplication reflected two structural possibilities in the cluster of traditions collectively termed “Hinduism” in the West, some of which stress union with God and others the self-realization of the individual. In either case, coping strategies can be directed at an ‘agent’ who transcends the subjective self, since the self-realization of the individual also requires self-forgetfulness and transcendence of individual concerns. 

	Part of the significance of this study for the present paper is a result that contradicted the expectations of the researchers. They hypothesized that key differences between Hindu and Christian belief-systems would lead to different forms of coping: in particular, fatalism linked to the idea of Karma and the role of detachment in managing stress (e.g. Dalal & Pande 1988) would combine to produce a distinct form of coping . However, this difference was smaller than expected (Karma was never explicitly mentioned) (p.621), and other similarities emerged: for example, the higher rate of religious coping in older and married subjects, and its positive link to mental health. They conclude that the scale seems to work in the same way, even if some themes (e.g. belief in a Higher Power) may be understood in a different way.
	The relatively small scale of the study (the questions were developed in interviews with only 15 Hindus) and the fact that the subjects were westernized Hindus resident in the USA counsel against placing too much reliance on the results: other studies have demonstrated the tendency for recently-imported religions to acquire distinct american-christian characteristics (e.g. Greeley & Hout 1999, who found that belief in life after death was higher in third-generation Jewish immigrants than their grandparents ). However, the results point tentatively to the likelihood that the styles of religious coping have a correlate in universal cognitive psychology, and that under certain circumstances it is possible to trace comparable processes in a variety of contexts.
	Abu Raiya, Pargament, Mahoney and Stein (2008) have developed a scale for Muslims which does not seem to  include the same element of 'relation' at all. The study on which this was based (Abu Raiya 2004) used an online questionnaire of 205 participants of which slightly over half were in the US, and the rest were scattered across the other continents. This is therefore a cross-culktural, if rather coarse-grained, study, and the fact that ‘intimacy’ does not seem to be a factor is curious. Further work would need to be done to see what is going on here. One answer might be that in an Islamic context relationship to god is by obedience to god’s laws, with god's judgement on misdeeds treated as swift and specific. Therefore religious coping may have a more direct connection to attempting to behave in a religious way than to feelings of closeness to god. In obedience to the law of god one finds an assurance that god is all-powerful and well-disposed to those who keep the law. 
	
Finally, an intriguing twist to this tale is provided by the work of van Uden, Pieper and Alma (2004) on the application of Pargament’s method in the Netherlands. Studying the role of ‘receptivity’ in coping (loosely definable as “trust that a way will unfold in a difficult situation”) they discovered a negative correlation between receptivity and anxiety. However, counterintuitively, they also found that the negative correlation was stronger for those who were receptive in a general sense (“something will reveal itself” than in a specifically religious one (“something will be revealed by an agent”). This suggests the operation of ToM without prior stimulation by HADD: a basis for a form of secular “religious coping” that is typically overlooked. (Van Uden et al. 2004; Ganzevoort 2004)

Clearly, further work needs to be done across cultures and across religions. At the moment the evidence concerning this model’s applicability across cultures and religions is equivocal. Unfortunately,most  studies that have been undertaken in the UK and Holland (Loewenthal et al 2001; Lewis et al 2005; Braam et al 2010), even those using Pargament's tools, have not focussed on the question of religious coping styles. This is in part a demonstration of the point made at the beginning of this paper – that in the absence of theoretical reasons to focus on these particular aspects of religious coping, there is no common language – and indicates the need for further study

Conclusions
	The findings of section 2 suggest that there are three layers to the analysis of religious coping which correspond to the three key points of the model. First, it can be affirmed that religious coping has a significant cognitive component, with outcomes susceptible to differences in ideas about god; further, it presumes the belief that there is “something there”, which may be ascribed to the HADD and which, by definition, underlies the four coping styles named by Pargament ; finally, that two of the coping styles (Collaborative and Deferring) construct a more developed relationship between the subject and their god than the other two (Self-Directing and Plead) and so may be understood to draw more on the ToM mechanism. Some research (Nairn & Merluzzi 2003) indicates that, although conceptually distinguishable, these two useful styles are typically found together and exert a positive effect in the same way – by critical reliance on a source of support.
	The findings of section 3 were more equivocal and would bear significantly more focussed research. It is clearly premature to suggest that this theory should be applied normatively in healthcare policy and practice to determine the shape of the provision of ‘spiritual care’. However, it does point to the areas in which the key questions might fruitfully be asked. Were these findings to be adapted into a clinical tool, it might be expected to have three key elements:
1.	A question designed to elicit the ways in which the patient has an intuition of an ‘other’ or presence, however defined, and to encourage them to pay attention to this intuition.
2.	A question about the disposition and character of this ‘other’ in relation to the patient: is it benign? Is it involved with the patient?
3.	 A question about the ways in which that intuition is expressed, modified or interfered with by religious and secular beliefs and practices.
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^1	  Here and throughout I have employed the term god to signify a subject’s belief in an unseen reality which may or may not be expressed in theistic terms. I have adopted this as the best among a number of unsatisfactory options, since it carries neither the reverence of God or the implied scepticism of “god”. The further implications of these terms will be explored in the course of the paper.
^2	  Here, ‘theistic’ refers to belief in a single personal god as expressed in Judaism, Christianity and Islam. Although Hinduism, for example, includes gods they are not typically understood in a ‘theistic’ way
